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NOTES
SEIDER v. ROTH: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PHASE
The modern concept of jurisdiction based on substance and
quality of contacts received judicial recognition in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington," with the rejection by the United States
Supreme Court of the conceptual physical power approach. Pen-
noyer v. Neff 2 promulgated a theory of. jurisdiction based upon
actual "physical power" and incorporated it into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 The basic rule enunciated
in Pennoyer necessitated the actual physical presence of the de-
fendant within the forum at the time Qf service for the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction, and the physical presence of property
within the forum for the exercise of in ren or quasi in rem
jurisdiction.4 International Shoe, without overruling Pennoyer,
announced an expanded theory of jurisdiction based on "interests"
and "contacts." Henceforth, in subjecting a defendant to an in
personam judgment, due 'process would be satisfied by "certain
minimum contacts" with the forum consistent with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' In enlarging the
1326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm:
Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction i Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 536.
In order for a court to adjudicate validly it must have subject matter juris-
diction, give notice to the parties involved and have jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant or a res.
295 U.S. 714 (1877). See also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91
(1917) for Mr. Justice Holmes' classic dictum: "The foundation of juris-
diction is physical power ... "
3 See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and The
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 572-73
(1958).
4 In the years prior to International Shoe, the Pennoyer doctrine was
supplemented with the concepts of "consent" and "domicile." Thus, for
example, a domiciliary of a state could be sued in his home state despite
his absence from it. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). A non-
resident operator of a motor vehicle could be subjected to suit in the state
where his negligence gave rise to the cause of action, because he had
impliedly "consented" to jurisdiction by using the state's roads. Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
5 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). It
should be noted that although the Court was dealing with a corporate. de-
fendant, it was strongly indicated that the test announced is applicable to
natural persons. The due process- clause "does not contemplate that a state
may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." Id.
at 319. See Developments in the La---State Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARv. L. REv. 909, 935 (1960). The practical considerations to be made
in the case of a corporate defendant appear to be quite different from those
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bases for personal jurisdiction, International Shoe has been respon-
sible for the growth of the modern "long-arm" statute3 and for
the decreased significance of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The tra-
ditional distinction between quasi in rem and in personam juris-
diction has been blurred in some cases 7 and the need for quasi
in rem jurisdiction has been seriously questioned."
In a modern era of jurisdiction the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in Seider v. Roth 9 is curiously unique. In an
effort to provide a local forum for New York residents injured
in out of state accidents, the Court anchored its rationale in an
expansion of the anachronistic doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction
over an intangible. Plaintiffs, New York residents, were injured
in an automobile accident in Vermont through the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant, a Canadian domiciliary. The defendant's
automobile liability insurance policy was issued and delivered in
Canada by an insurer that was also doing business in New York.
Unable to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the
to be made in the case of an individual. It is in this context that Inter-
national Shoe's express provision for an "estimate of the inconveniences"
involved becomes particularly relevant. 326 U.S. at 317. See Ehrenzweig,
Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 285, 292
(1958), discussing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957) and its impact on the Pemwyer doctrine.
' See, e.g., UNIFORMt INTERSTATE & INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE Acr§ 1.03. See generally Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years
of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Homburger,
The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow,
15 BUFFALO L. Ray. 61 (1965).
7See, e.g., Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960
(1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub norn Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), where jurisdiction quasi
in rem over an intangible was based on totality of contacts, an in personam
test. See 46 CALIF. L. REv. 637, 639 (1958). See also Comment, Adjudica-
tion of Personal Rights By Proceedings Quasi In Rem, 10 STAN. L. Rv.
750 (1958).
The Atkinson approach received Mr. Justice Douglas' endorsement in
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 263-64 (1958) (dissenting opinion), and
Hanson has been criticized as an unnecessary retention of the conceptual
approach. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L.
REv. 657, 658 (1959). Compare Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950), with Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 246-47 (1958).
s See generall y Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rein Juris-
diction, 76 HARv. L. REv. 303 (1962). See also Kurland, supra note 3,
at 617 (quasi in rem jurisdiction termed a "fiction" which necessarily
hinders analysis of jurisdictional problems).
9 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See Com-
ment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Conttingent Obligations and the Interstate
Corporation, 67 CoLum. L. Rav. 550 (1967); 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv.
147 (1966); 16 BuFFALO L. REv. 769 (1967); 51 MINN. L. REv. 158 (1966);
19 STAN. L. REV. 654 (1967).
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plaintiffs attached the insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify
its insured as a basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction. The Court
of Appeals upheld the attachment, characterizing the obligations
to defend and indemnify as a "debt" 10 owing to the defendant
and having a juridical situs 1 in New York for attachment pur-
poses. The consequence of allowing this unique attachment has
been to create a whole new area of jurisdiction. A "Seider action"
proceeds nominally in rem but, because of the nature of the
"debt" attached and the further provisions of the New York
practice statute, it yields in personam results on the basis of con-
tacts that are insufficient for the normal exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
While aware of the practical difficulties 12 that Seider has
created and the questionable constitutionality of its rationale, a
sharply divided Court of Appeals has nevertheless recently upheld
its validity in Simpson v. Loehrnann.13 But, in Podolsky v. DeVin-
ney,1' the District Court for the Southern District of New York
has reached a contrary conclusion. In a carefully reasoned opin-
ion, Judge Croake has refuted the constitutional position taken by
the Simpson Court. It is to a discussion of the constitutional dif-
ficulties involved in the Seider progeny as well as to the practical
and theoretical effect that Podolsky and Simpson will have on the
Seider rule that this paper is devoted.
10 Dissenting, Judge Burke vigorously objected to this characterization:
"The so-called "debt" which is supposed to be subject to attachment
is a mere promise made to the nonriesident insured by the foreign
insurance carrier to defend and indemnify the Canadian resident if a
suit is cmnmenced and if damages are awarded against the insured.
Such a promise is contingent in nature. . . . [P]laintiffs indulge in
circular ratiocination. The jurisdiction, they assert, is based upon a
promise which evidently does not mature until there is jurisdiction."
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99, 103 (1966).
11 In the case of an intangible such as a debt or a chose in action, the
debt follows the debtor, i.e., it is present wherever jurisdiction may be
asserted over the debtor. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
12 For a continuing commentary on Seider and the collateral problems
it has posed in New York practice see Siegel, 7B McKINNx,'s CPLR 5201,
supp. commentary 13-31 (1967), and The Quaiterly Survey of New York
Practice, 41 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 463, 490-92 (1967) (brief discussion of the
difficulty of assigning a value to the attached res and discussion of potential
calendar burdens); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST.
JOHN's L. Rav. 128, 157 (1967) (discussion of Jones v. McNeill, 51 Misc.
2d 527, 273 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1966) holding Seider constitutional);
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 436,
451 (1968) (discussion of Gazerwitz v. Adrian, 28 App. Div. 2d 556, 280
N.Y.S.2d 233 (2d Dep't 1967) (memorandum decision) holding that a Seider-
type defendant must submit to an examination before trial but implying
that no personal appearance would result from such submission).
13 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
14281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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The Seider Procedure
The Attachnent
According to traditional rules of jurisdiction, before property
may be made the subject of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction,
it must be present within the forum. There is little difficulty in
establishing the situs of real property or tangible personalty, but
intangibles are another matter.'5  In order to subject intangibles
to in rem jurisdiction under the traditional appproach, they must
be assigned a situs by use of a recognized judicial fiction.10
Intangibles that are evidenced by a document, i.e., stocks,
bonds, warehouse receipts and other commercial instruments, or-
dinarily are deemed to be present in the jurisdiction where the
document is located.Y Pure intangibles such as debts or assign-
able causes of action are deemed to have a situs at the place where
jurisdiction may be asserted over the obligor." That is, follow-
ing the somewhat dated rule of Harris v. Balk,'9 in the case of an
ordinary debt, the debt follows the debtor.
Under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, a debt
is attachable if it is "past due or . . . is yet to become due,
certainly or upon demand .... ,,20 A serious question is thus
posed as to whether the complex obligations to defend and con-
tingently indemnify, embodied in an automobile liability insurance
policy, may be characterized as a "debt" under the statute. "Seider
cases" have rather blithely answered this question in the affirma-
tive despite the fact that these obligations arguably do not come
15 See Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, supra
note 5, at 951. For a general discussion of the problem involved in assign-
ing various intangibles a situs for different purposes see Andrews, Situs of
Intangibles in Suits Against Non-Resident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241
(1939).
"0 "The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction, but there are times
when justice or convenience requires that a legal situs be ascribed to them.
... At the root of the selections is generally a common sense appraisal of
the requirement of justice and convenience in particular conditions. . ....
Severnoe Securities Corp. v. London & Lancashire, 255 N.Y. 120, 123, 174
N.E. 299, 300 (1931). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246-47
(1959).
17 See Developments in the Laz-State Court Jurisdiction, supra note
5, at 951. It should be noted that stock in a corporation may present
the problem of a dual situs. Id. at 952.
18 Id. at 951.
10 193 U.S. 215 (1905).
20 CPLR 5201 (a) (emphasis added). For a general discussion of the
section see 6 WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MILLR, NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
lfff 5201.04-.06 (1964).
A CPLR 5201 debt is attachable via CPLR 6202. See generally
7 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, Nmv YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, 1111 6202.01-.14
(1964). See 16 BUFFALo L, REv. 769, 770-71 (1967).
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into existence until jurisdiction is independently obtained over the
insured.21
An examination of previous New York decisional law dis-
closes that although the attachment of insurance obligations has
been allowed in some cases, they are distinguishable from Seider
either factually or operationally. Heavy reliance has been placed
upon Matter of Riggle,22 but Riggle arose in a special context.
The plaintiff, a New York resident, started an in personam action
there after an automobile accident in Wyoming with the defend-
ant, a resident of Illinois. After defendant's death, the plaintiff
sought to have the Surrogate's Court appoint a local administra-
tor, claiming that the obligations in a liability insurance policy
covering the decedent, issued in New York by an insurer doing
business in New York, were a debt within the contemplation of
the New York Surrogate's Court Act.23 Although the Court of
Appeals agreed with the plaintiff's contention, it should be noted
that in Riggle the insurance policy' was issued in New York. This
appeared to be a significant fact in allowing the attachment.24
Furthermore, Riggle operates in the limited context of allowing
the appointment of an administrator of local property rights. If
the administrator, as the alter ego of the decedent, is made a party
to the action, the judgment can only be executed against such
property.25
Despite the heavy reliance upon Riggle, the strongest prece-
dent for the characterization of insurance policy obligations as
an attachable debt is Fishman v. Sanders . 2  But, even Fishman is
distinguishable. The action arose out of an automobile accident
in New York between two New York residents. Because of diffi-
culty in serving the defendant, the plaintiff attached the obligations
embodied in the defendant's insurance policy. Although Fishman
21 Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d99, 103 (1966) (dissenting opinion). For a discussion of what obligations
are attached in a "Seider case" see Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles:
Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, supra note 9, at
552-53.
22 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962). See 16
BUFFALO L. RFv. 769, 772 (1967).
23 SuRR. CT. AcT § 47, now embodied in SCPA §§ 206, 208. It should be
noted that these sections make no reference to the contingency of an obliga-
tion as does CPLR 5201.24  
re Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 79, 181 N.E.2d 436, 439, 226 N.Y.S.2d
416, 419-20 (1962).
25Id. at 76, 181 N.E.2d at 437, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
26 18 App. Div. 2d 689, 235 N.Y.S.2d 861 (2d Dep't 1962). Interestingly,
the concurring opinion limited the attachment to the obligation to defend
since only that obligation was considered extant at the time of the accident.
Id. at 690, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 863. For the final disposition of this case see
15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.F_2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965). See also 16
BuFFAO L. REv. 769, 772 (1967).
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approved of the attachability of the obligations, its scope is quite
different from that of Seider. In Fishnuzn, plaintiff had personal
jurisdiction over the absconding resident-defendant all along.
Finally, in Baurngold Bros., Inc. v. Schwarzschild Bros.,27 the
plaintiff, pursuant to contract, delivered jewelry to the defendant,
a Virginia corporation. The jewelry was stolen from the defend-
ant's office and the plaintiff attached the proceeds of defendant's
insurance policy after notice of loss was given, but before proof
of loss was filed. The distinction between this case and Seider is
in the nature of the insurance policies involved; the liability of
the insurance company was independent of the suit between the
plaintiff and defendant. Thus, without direct precedent to guide
the way, "Seider actions" have proceeded to cause untold difficul-
ties for both the insured, the insurer, and the courts.
The Practical Dilemna
Perhaps the procedure sanctioned by Seider would be more
tolerable if its applicability were not so potentially extensive.
But, this is not so. Automobile owners are today required by
financial responsibility laws 28 to procure automobile liability in-
surance. The typical policy exacts the cooperation of the insured
and provides that the insurer will investigate, defend actions
brought against the insured and indemnify him against his liability
up to the amount of the policy coverage.29 Realistically, most of
the nation's motorists are insured by a relatively small number
of insurance carriers who do business in a substantial number of
states, including, of course, New York. The potential scope of
the Seider rule is thus evident; all that is apparently needed to
trigger the rule is a New York resident plaintiff and a defendant
insured by a company doing business in New York? °
27276 App. Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd, 302 N.Y.
628, 97 N.E.2d 357 (1951). See also 16 BUFFALO L. Rav. 769, 772 (1967).
See generally Johnson, Attachment of Chases in Action in New York, 13
N.Y.U.L. REv. 371 (1936).
28 See, e.g., N.Y. VaIcLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 312: "No motor vehicle shall
be registered in this state unless the application for such registration is
accompanied by proof of financial security which shall be evidenced by a
certificate of insurance or evidence of a financial security bond. .. ."
29 See, e.g., E. PATTERSON & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
T E LAW OF INSURANcF 202-08, 697, 705, 708 (4th ed. 1961). See generally
Faude, The New Standard Automobile Policy, 1955 INs. L.J. 647. A
discussion of the insurer's duty to defend is contained in Note, The Insurer's
Duty to Defend Under a Liability Inmurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
734 (1966). A discussion of insurer-insured cooperation is contained in
Comment, A Sohtion to the Inequities From a Breach of the Cooperation
Clause in Automobile Liability Insurance, 2 HOUSTON L. REv. 92 (1964).3OSimpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 318, 234 N.E.2d 669,
676, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633. 643 (1967) (dissenting opinion). The Vaage
case, involving an action brought by a resident of Norway, and cited by
1968 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Upon notice of a "Seider" attachment action, the unassuming
defendant is met with both procedural and practical dilemmas. A
defendant may seek to dispute the validity of the attachment and
appeal this issue without subjecting himself to personal jurisdiction.
But "Seider cases" thus far have mandated that the attachment
be upheld. If the validity of the attachment is affirmed, or if the
defendant chooses not to contest the attachment, he may defend
on the merits and thus submit himself to full in personam juris-
diction. Alternatively, he may default, and thereby forfeit the
res.3 ' He may not enter a limited appearance, i.e., an appearance
limited only to the value of the res. Thus, defendant's first prac-
tical dilemma arises when he chooses to litigate on the merits, and
subjects himself to the strong possibility that the reported pro-
pensity of New York juries 32 will return a judgment beyond the
policy limits. Seemingly, the defendant's preferred choice would
be to default, but a second practical dilemma arises. Default is not
in the best interest of the insurer since it is not a party to a
"Seider action" and can protect its financial interest only if the
insured consents to proceed with the defense. Moreover, the in-
surer is armed with the possible use of the cooperation clause
of the insurance policy as a potential defense to a direct action
against it, after judgment, under Section 167 of the Insurance
Law.3 3  The end result of the procedural dilemma posed by CPLR
320(c) and the exhortations of the insurer is to force the insured
Judge Burke, has recently been dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.
Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dep't 1968).
31CPLR 320(c) abolishes a limited appearance and provides: "In a
case where the court's jurisdiction is not based upon personal service on the
defendant, an appearance is not the equivalent to personal service of the
summons upon the defendant if an objection to jurisdiction under paragraphs
eight or nine of subdivision (a) of rule 3211, or both, is asserted by
motion or in the answer . . . . unless the defendant proceeds with the
defense after asserting the objection to jurisdiction and the objection is not
ultimately sustained." See Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdic-
tional Motions it; New York, 14 BUFFALO L. REv. 374, 387 (1965) ; Note,
Article III of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules: Jurisdic-
tion, Service and Appearance, 37 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 285, 320-28 (1963).
Recently, doubt has been thrown on the status of 320(c) in a "Seider
case." In a memorandum denying a motion for reargument of the Simpson
case, the Court of Appeals has indicated that it would be willing to allow
a limited appearance, contrary to 320(c), in a "Seider case . ........... N.Y.2d
........ ..... ...... N .E.2d ............. ............ N .Y.S.2d ............ (1968).
32 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 316, 234, N.E.2d 669,
675, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641 (1967) (Breitel, J. concurring): "This State,
and particularly its chief city, is the mecca for those seeking high verdicts
in personal injury cases ... ." See also Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co.,
128 F. Supp. 228, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1955): "I gathered from the oral argu-
ment that plaintiff's purpose in bringing suit in this Court is to obtain
the benefit of the reputed largesse of New York City juries."
'3 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 309 n.2, 234 N.E.2d 669, 670 n.2,
287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 n.2 (1967).
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into a forum which has no substantial contact with the action.
The noose is drawn and defendant and any possible witnesses
who wish to appear are faced with the burden, expense and in-
convenience of defending in New York.
34
Constitutional Problems
The Defendant's Position
In Simpson v. Loehnmann,3  the defendant-insured objected to
the constitutionality of a "Seider attachment" as offensive to due
process.36 Employing a traditional approach to jurisdiction, Chief
Judge Fuld framed the issue as whether the obligation to defend
and indemnify constituted a sufficient property right of the de-
fendant to enable New York to exercise in rem jurisdiction. The
defendant's due process argument was disposed of with the state-
ment:
And we perceive no denial of due process since the presence of that
debt in this state (see, e.g., Harris v. Balk . . .)-contingent or
inchoate though it may be- represents sufficient of a property right
in the defendant to furnish the nexus with, and the interest in, New
York to empower its courts to exercise an in rem jurisdiction over
him.37
Reliance upon Harris v. Balk for the proposition that the
contingent obligation of the insurer is present in New York is
seemingly misplaced. First, Harris, in view of modem practice
and theory, is not sacrosanct.3 s The decision is from the Pennoyer
3a In one "Seidcr-based case," Jones v. McNeill, 51 Misc. 2d 527, 273
N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1966), the accident occurred in New Mexico, and the
defendant, a Californian, and the witnesses were forced to travel to New
York to defend the claim.
3 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
36A second argument, that the attachment imposed an undue burden
on interstate commerce in the field of insurance, was dismissed for lack
of standing. A third, that the attachment impairs the obligations of the
contract of insurance, was afforded cursory treatment. The defendant con-
tended that the attachment invited the insured to withhold cooperation.
Chief Judge Fuld answered this argument by stating that if the insured
failed to cooperate the insurer could withdraw and assert lack of co-
operation as a defense in any action brought against it under section 167
of the Insurance Law. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 309 n.2,
234 N.E.2d 669, 670 n.2, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 n.2 (1967).37M. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S2d at 636.
ISSee von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Anaysis, 79 HARV. L. RFv. 1121, 1178 (1966); Developments in the Law-
State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 957-60 (1960). It ap-
pears that the Harris decision was not well received by some scholars
even in its own era. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction, In Rem, to
Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARv. L. REv. 107, 113-22 (1913). A
19681
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era when the exercise of personal jurisdiction was severely cir-
cumscribed and the garnishment of intangibles served as a valuable
substitute for personal jurisdiction. The formalism involved in
determining the situs of the debt was necessary to spell out a
presence within the forum so that "power" over the intangible
could be exercised. Resort was had to the fiction that the debtor
carried the debt with him so that it could be garnisheed whenever
personal jurisdiction could be obtained over him. The modem
concept of personal jurisdiction leaves little justification for the
garnishment of intangibles. Moreover, the formalism of the Harris
approach is likely to result, as in Seider, in garnishment in a
forum which has no substantial contact with or interest in the
litigation. Advanced thinking has called for the abolition of Harris.
In Atkinson v. Superior Court,3 9 justice Traynor, who has been
responsible for other liberal trends in procedural and conflicts
fields, 40 refused to employ the fiction of assigning a situs to an
,intangible and exercised jurisdiction based on totality of contracts,
an in personam test.
Second, apart from consideration of modern jurisdictional
trends, the Harris situation is factually distinguishable from that
in Seider. In Harris, an ordinary debt concededly due was in-
volved. It was not contingent, i.e., the amount due was certain.
An ordinary debt is clearly distinguishable from the complex con-
glomeration of rights and duties embodied in an automobile lia-
bility insurance policy.41 Moreover, the garnishee in Harris was
a natural person, subject to jurisdiction, under then prevailing
law, in one forum at a time. The Seider garnishee, an interstate
corporation, is subject to jurisdiction under modern law in the
forum of its incorporation, and forums where it is doing business.
Thus, the Seider procedure, if adopted in other forums, poses
the inherent danger of substantial conflict among different forums
which could claim presence within their own jurisdiction. Thus,
for example, if state X were to adopt the "Seider procedure" and
an accident were to occur in which both the state X resident and
the New York resident were injured by a defendant from state
contrary view was expressed in Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for
the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation, 31 HA v. L.
REv. 905, 912-18 (1918).
.949 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied
sub nora. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569(1958). See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. R v.
657, 660-61 (1959).
40His decision in Bernhard v. Bank of Anmerica Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), initiated the modern trend in the
field of collateral estoppel. See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest
Brews, 53 CArui. L. REV. 25 (1965).
41See Simpson v. Loehmanr, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 320, 234 N.E.2d 669, 677,
287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 647 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
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Y, a potential dispute would arise. If the defendant's insurer
were doing business in New York and state X, both states could
claim presence of the debt.4 2
Podolsky v. DeVinney 43 refutes the view of Seiders constitu-
tionality taken by the Court of Appeals. The main thrust of the
opinion is not a frontal assault on Harris v. Balk, which is regarded
as viable within its own confines, i.e., a simple debt. The court
emphasized the relatively complex aggregate of rights and obliga-
tions embodied in a liability insurance policy and concluded that they
could not be characterized as a debt within the confines of due
process. The Podolsky court, unlike Chief Judge Fuld, refused to
employ the methodical step-by-step application of traditional juris-
dictional principles, but rather viewed the procedure as a unitary
whole, emphasizing its net results.
While the duty to defend is a substantial benefit to the insured,
the court, agreeing with the analysis of dissenting Judge Burke,
pointed out that this obligation does not arise by the policy's own
terms until jurisdiction is obtained over the insured. More im-
portantly, perhaps, when viewed in a proper context, the obligation
of the insurer to defend is also an invaluable right to it, essential
to the protection of the company's financial interest in the outcome
of the litigation. The Seider procedure ignores both of these fac-
tors by characterizing the policy obligations as a simple debt.
This erroneous characterization, in Judge Croake's view, was
sufficiently detrimental to the insured to allow the standing neces-
sary to attack it. Assuming that at the time of the attachment
the obligation to defend was the res attached, and that the Court
of Appeals did not consider the obligation to indemnify as matured,
it was reasoned that if the attachment were upheld and litigation
allowed to proceed that the defendant would necessarily lose a
sufficient part of the res to be of constitutional moment. The Dis-
trict Court took a broad view of the entire Seider procedure,
putting the attachment into its proper context as one step in a
unified process, ultimately compelling an insured to submit to per-
sonal jurisdiction without minimum contacts. Unlike the Harris
case, the defendant in a "Seider case" is denied due process because
he cannot make an intelligent choice with regard to defaulting.
The choice can be made only when the amount to be forfeited is
known. The defendant under 320(c) is forced to come into the
action to ascertain this amount, and in so doing submits to per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Chief Judge Fuld, by compartmentalizing the attachment,
isolates it from the reality of the total procedure and thus by-
42 Podolsky v. DeVinney. 281 F. Supp. 488, 493, n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
43281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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passes the reason why Judge Croake considers the procedure un-
constitutional. In Simpson, it is stated:
[N]either the Seider decision nor the present one purports to expand
the basis for in personam jurisdiction in view of the fact that the
recovery is necessarily limited to the value of the asset attached, that
is, the liability insurance policy.44
But, this overlooks CPLR 320(c) abolishing a limited appear-
ance in New York. If the defendant wishes to contest, and in a
"Seider case" there is no other way, besides judicial fiat, to measure
the amount that will be paid over to the plaintiff in case of a
default, he must submit to personal jurisdiction.
This is the very problem that Justice Meyer recently wrestled
with in Lefcourt v. Seacrest Hotel & Motor Inn, Iiwt. 45  He
refused to dismiss a defense raising the issue of due process
in regard to the reasonableness and justice of the Seider pro-
cedure. It was noted that in the "Seider" type situation CPLR
320(c) acts not as a reasonable inducement to appear but rather
as a draconian lever which gives "no consideration whatsoever to
the balancing of interests usually involved." 46
Judge Croake found the dilemma that section 320(c) places
on the defendant in the context of an attachment of a con-
tingent obligation as the denial of fair play and substantial justice
that makes Seider unconstitutional vis-a-vis the defendant. No
attempt was made to characterize 320(c) as unconstitutional per se.
Presumably, when working within the context of the attachment of
real property, tangible personalty and non-contingent intangibles,
320(c) is not constitutionally infirm. In any event, he expressly
declined to consider whether due process would be denied the
-defendant if a limited appearance by him were allowed in a "Seider
case."
The Insurer's Position
The Seider procedure has frequently been analogized to a
direct action against the insurer without the necessity of first
obtaining a judgment against the insured. The analogy has been
44Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 234 N.E.2d, 669, 671,
287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636-37 (1967). This statement is now subject to the
qualification of the memorandum denying a motion for reargument of the
Simpson case. See supra note 31. If the expressed willingness of the
Court of Appeals, to allow a limited appearance in a Seider case, is im-
plemented, an entirely new light is thrown on the arguments raised in the
Simpson and Podolsky cases. See Ausubel Seider Re-examined, 159 N.Y.L.J.
(April 24, 1968).
45 54 Misc. 2d 376, 282 N.YS.2d. 896 (Sup. Ct. 1967).46 Id. at 383, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04.
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unfortunate. While the direct action procedure is akin to the
Seider procedure, there are significant distinctions between them,
making the direct action procedure constitutional and the Seider
procedure questionable.
In his Simpson concurrence, Judge Keating relied heavily on
the direct action analogy. In employing this functional approach,
the insurer was viewed as the real party in the interest and the
position of the insured was de-emphasized. Heavy reliance for the
proposition that Seider was nothing more than a judicially created
direct action was placed on Oltarsh v. Aetna Insurance Co.4 7 and
Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance Co.4s Both cases appear
to be distinguishable from Seider.
Oltarsh is more aptly characterized as a choice of law decision
than one concerning jurisdiction per se. The plaintiff, a New
York resident, was injured in Puerto Rico in a building owned
by a Puerto Rican corporation. The insurance policy was issued
and delivered in Puerto Rico by an insurance company also doing
business in New York. A Puerto Rican statute allowed a direct
action against an insurer. In a suit by the plaintiff against the
insurance company in New York, the Court of Appeals applied
the grouping of contacts theory and allowed the statutory direct
action to be maintained in New York.4 0
While the Oltarsh fact pattern is similar to that of Seider,
the procedure is clearly different. In a direct action there is
no attachment and the insurer is the defendant. In a "Seider case,"
the insured is the defendant and the insurer, who stands to lose
everything by the action, is not even a party. In a direct action
since the insurer is the defendant it is allowed to protect its finan-
cial interest in the outcome by interposing the defenses that the
insured may have. In a "Seider case," the insurer cannot submit
any defenses without the consent of the insured. These differences
must be considered carefully. The lack of procedural safeguards
vis-a-vis the insurer is emphasized by the fact that the insured, by
failing to authorize an appearance, which is clearly in his best
interests, may subject the insurer to uncontested liability up to
the face value of the policy.50 This is a total perversion of the
47 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
48349 U.S. 66 (1954).
49 Parenthetically, the Oltarsh Court may be criticized for transporting
the direct action to New York. Puerto Rico's civil law dictates that such
an action be tried without a jury. By allowing a jury trial in New York,
the New York Court deprived the insurer of the "safety-valve" protection
of freedom from an overly sympathetic jury. See 39 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
383, 386 (1965).
0 Hypothetically, under section 167(1) (b) of the New York Insurance
Law a direct action could be brought against the insurer thirty days after
a default. The previous default would preclude the insurer on the question
of liability. See, e.g., Manard v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 12 App. Div.
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insurer's right -to control the action, and thus protect its financial
interest. It should be evident that the Seider procedure may be
analogized to a direct action only by ignoring the procedural safe-
guards that are afforded an insurer by the direct action procedure.
Lack of these safeguards is enough to condemn Seider as uncon-
stitutional vis-a-vis the insurer. But, even if this reasoning is
overlooked, there appears to be a second ground upon which to
question Seider's constitutionality vis-a-vis the insurer. If it be
conceded that New York has jurisdiction over the insurer because
it is doing business there, the question of whether New York has
sufficient contact and interest in the action to subject the insurer
to a direct action remains unanswered. judge Keating relied
heavily on Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance Co. for his
answer to this question. But, Watson is apparently distinguishable.
In Watson, the Supreme Court allowed the Louisiana courts
to "rewrite" a contract of insurance by allowing a direct action
pursuant to Louisiana statute, although the contract expressly pre-
cluded such action. The policy, issued in Massachusetts and
delivered in Massachusetts and Illinois, contained a provision, valid
in those states, barring a direct action against the insurer. Louisi-
ana's direct action statute was applied, which in effect invalidated
the provision and enlarged the duties of the insurer. But a further
recital of the facts indicates interests of and contacts with Louisiana
2d 29, 207 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1960), iotion for reargument and leave to appeal
denied, 12 App. Div. 2d 891, 212 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (4th Dep't 1961); Lauri-
tano v. American Fire Ins. Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 564, 162 N.Y.S.2d 553(1st Dep't 1957), aff'd inem., 4 N.Y.2d 1028, 152 N.E.2d 546, 177 N.Y.S.2d
530 (1953). Its only possible defense to the claim would be, as Judge
Fuld suggests in Simpson, a breach of the cooperation clause. It seems
unlikely that this defense would be sustained. First, the burden required
of the insurer to show lack of cooperation is extremely difficult to sustain.
See, e.g., Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225
N.E.2d 503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967). Second, as Judge Croake points out,
the insurer is a fiduciary and cannot haphazardly subject the insured to
the risk of judgment in excess of the coverage limits. In a "Seider case,"
its duty would be to instruct the insured to remain out of the action. If
it performs this duty, how can it defend on the ground of breach of co-
operation? Beyond the possibility that the insurer may be liable for an
amount up to the policy limits without ever having defended on the merits,
lies the possibility that it would have to pay on the policy twice. Suppose
the insurer is required to pay in the New York action, does that discharge
him from liability in state X where there is another potential plaintiff in-jured in the same accident? The question is: is the New York adjudication
entitled to full faith and credit? See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy,
241 U.S. 518 (1916). Compare Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 317,
234 N.F_.2d 669, 676, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 643 n.1 (1967) (dissenting opin-
ion) with Lefcourt v. Sea Crest Hotel and Motor Inn, Inc. 54 Misc. 2d
376, 380-81, 282 N.Y.S.2d 896, 901 (1967). Moreover, if the res attached
is the obligation to defend, isn't the insurer being required to pay twice?
That is, once in defense of the action and twice in satisfaction of any
claim pursuant to judgment.
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that justified such treatment. Suit was brought by a Louisiana
resident for injuries occurring in Louisiana, as the result of use
of the defendant's product, sold in Louisiana.
The Supreme Court emphasizes these facts:
Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in affairs
beyond her boundaries which are no concern of hers. Persons injured
or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even
if not, Louisiana may have to care for them. Serious injuries may
require treatment in Louisiana homes or hospitals by Louisiana doctors.
The injured may be destitute. They may be compelled to call upon
friends, relatives, or the public for help. Louisiana has manifested its
natural interest in the injured by providing remedies for the recovery of
damages. It has a similar interest in policies of insurance which are
designed to assure ultimate payment of such damages. Moreover, Loui-
siana courts in most instances provide the most convenient forum for
trial of these cases.51
Judge Keating places heavy emphasis on those portions of the
Supreme Court's opinion that deal with the problem of providing
a remedy for the injured plaintiff. He thus seeks to spell out a
legitimate governmental interest in New York to protect the plain-
tiffs injured in "Seider cases" by enlarging the insurer's duties.
But, as Judge Croake 52 and Judge Burke5 point out in refuting
his argument, New York has no such interest in a "Seider case."
The injury occurs in another state; that is why resort is had to
the in rei process in the first place. The contacts that Louisiana
had in Watson were so strong that they would have been sufficient
to subject the defendant to in personam jurisdiction in Louisiana
under modern long-arm statutes. The only contact that New
York has in a "Seider case" is that a New York resident is injured.
But, the Supreme Court has said in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick 54
GINWatson v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Co., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954)
(emphasis added).
52 Podolsky v. DeVinney 231 F. Supp. 488, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In
Podolsky, a typical "Seider case," Judge Croake pointed out: "The accident
occurred in New Jersey; the defendants are residents of New Jersey; the
witnesses are more readily available in New Jersey than in New York. Fur-
ther, the plaintiff was treated in a New Jersey hospital, presumably by New
Jersey physicians, obviating New York's interest, at least in the short run, in
the medical care given its citizen."
52 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 318, 234 N.E.2d 669, 677, 287
N.Y.S.2d 633, 644 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
4281 U.S. 397, 403 (1930). "[AIll things in regard to performance
were to be done outside of Texas. Neither the Texas laws nor the Texas
courts were invoked for any purpose, except by [plaintiff] in the bringing
of this suit. The fact that [plaintiff's] permanent residence was in Texas
is without significance. At all times here material, he was physically present
and acting in Mexico. Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the
terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater obligation
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that this fact alone is not enough to allow a state to "rewrite" a
contract of insurance. On analysis, the contacts New York has
with the action appear to be insufficient to mandate a legislative
direct action statute, much less informal judicial enactment of one.
The Practical Impact of Podolsky and Simpson
Although the New York Court of Appeals and the Southern
District have reached opposite conclusions on the issue of Seider's
constitutional validity, both courts have manifested a distaste with
the case that forbodes its eventual demise. Four of the seven
judges on the Court of Appeals have expressly manifested dis-
enchantment with Seider. Of the three judges who approved
Seider, one, Judge Van Voorhis, is now retired, and even Chief
Judge Fuld expresses his underlying distrust of Seider by a plea
to the legislature. Judges Breitel and Bergan whose votes were
needed to achieve a majority in Simpson, concurred, but only out
of deference to court unity. Judge Breitel commented on Seider's
theoretical unsoundness and its undesirable practical consequences
"to hasten the day of its overruling or its annulment by legisla-
tion." 55 With a marked absence of equivocation, Judge Croake
reached the conclusion that the procedure is unconstitutional be-
cause he felt that that result was "unavoidable." 50
The direct consequence of the Podolsky opinion appears to be
an effective emasculation of the Seider procedure. Podolsky was
typical of most "Seider cases," i.e., the plaintiff was a New York
resident, the accident occurred in another state with a non-resident
defendant. In view of the fact that the normal "Seider case" is
removable to the district courts upon a showing of diversity of
citizenship and requisite jurisdictional amount, a "Seider defendant"
could apparently procure vacatur of the attachment by the expedient
than that agreed upon and to seize property in payment of the imposed
obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of property without
due process of law." See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Delta & Pine Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149 (1934). A state may not "enlarge
the obligations of the parties to accord with every local statutory policy
solely upon the ground that one of the parties is its own citizen." Both
cases are discussed at length by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Watson v.
Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1954) (concurring
opinion).
S55Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 314, 234 N.E.2d 669, 674,
287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 640 (1967) (concurring opinion).
56 Podolsky v. DeVinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In di-
versity cases the district courts are bound by the Erie doctrine to follow the
law as announced by the highest state court, even if the federal court feels
that the precedent is erroneous. But when the state court's decision is chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds, the district court must defer to the decisions
of the Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts. Id. at 491.
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of removal.57  But, even if a case cannot be removed, for example,
because of failure to meet the jurisdictional amount, the uncertainty
in the law that emerges from a reading of Simpson and Podolsky
would appear to be an effective, albeit indirect, prophylactic to
Seider's continued use.
The plaintiff who now relies on Seider is likely to put himself
through a good deal of litigation that may be at best wasteful,
and at worst, positively harmful. Even if it may be assumed that
the procedure is constitutional, a hypothetical drawn by Professor
Siegel on the basis of Chief Judge Fuld's dictum in Simpson is
particularly apt to illustrate the plaintiff's problems. D, a resident
of state X insures his automobile with a state X company that is
also doing business in New York. An accident occurs in state X
in which P, a New York resident, is injured. P commences a
"Seider action" in New York, and D refuses to allow his insurance
company to appear in the action. The insurance company with-
draws from the suit claiming non-cooperation. The plaintiff takes
judgment by default and 30 days thereafter, brings a direct action
against the insurer pursuant to Section 167 of the Insurance Law.5
If the disclaimer is upheld on the basis of insured's non-cooperation,
pursuant to Judge Fuld's dictum, the plaintiff would have to sue
in state X where in personam jurisdiction could be asserted. Thus,
57The requirement of diversity of citizenship is contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1964). For a general discussion of the requirement of "complete"
diversity and the monetary amount see C. WRIGHT, FEERAL COURTS
§§24, 32 (1963). Until the recent amendment of Rule 4(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1963, there was some question as to whether
a "Seider case" could have been initiated in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 139 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1944) (the plain-
tiff initiated an action in the federal court by means of garnishment. On
appeal the cause was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). However, there
was never any question that an action initiated quasi in rem in state courts
could be removed to the federal courts see C. WRIGHT, supra § 65. For
the debate as to whether federal courts should be allowed to use quasi in
rem jurisdiction, compare Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem
Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 303 (1962). "Now that the venerable con-
cept of quasi in rem jurisdiction has largely outlived its utility, it is
proposed at long last to make it available in the federal courts," with
Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 MIcH. L.
REv. 337, 338 (1961) (contending that it was anamolous that the state
courts could exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction but the federal courts
could not).
58 There is some question as to whether Section 167 of the Insurance
Law would be applicable. That section, as pointed out by Professor Siegel,
applies to insurance contracts "issued or delivered" in New York State.
See Siegel, Simpson Upholds Seider-Problems for Both Sides, 159
N.Y.L.J. 1, 5 n.8, (Jan. 24, 1968). Moreover, there is some question as to
whether the insurer would be able to withdraw as easily as is intimated by
Judge Fuld's dictum. See Podolsky v. DeVinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 495
n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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his action up to this point would have been a complete waste of
time. Further, if the disclaimer is upheld in state X, the insured
would possibly be liable for the full amount of any prospective
judgment and the plaintiff, by use of the Seider procedure, would
then have deprived himself of the benefit of the defendant's insur-
ance coverage on the judgment.5
Another problem faces the plaintiff who now chooses to rely
on Seider, i.e., the possibility of lengthy litigation on the constitu-
tionality of the attachment. If the plaintiff wins on this issue, he
has no worries; but the probabilities in favor of this assumption
have now changed. If he loses on this issue, he will then be forced
to commence an action de novo in a state where he can obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant. By that time, the pertinent statute
of limitations may have expired on the cause of action.
6 0
_
Thus, when Podolsky is read in conjunction with Simpson, the
practical effect is an immediate stop order on further use of the
Seider doctrine.
Theoretical Implications
Can the Seider Procedure Be Cured Legislatively.
Realistically, the motivation for the Seider procedure cannot
be ascribed to the Court of Appeals' desire to become entangled in
highly technical jurisdictional problems. Seider is the product
of an intention-commendable, but for the fact that it imposes an
undue burden on defendants-to provide an injured resident with
a local forum and a financially competent defendant. The difficulty
lies in the procedural route chosen. The question now becomes
whether this intention can be implemented through a constitutionally
acceptable alternative. No doubt, Seider was inspired by the fac-
tually similar Oltarsh case, and the rationale of the Court of
Appeals proceeds from the assumption that if relief may be af-
forded in Oltarsh, it is unfair to deny it in Seider.
In Podolsky, Judge Croake expressly refused to decide whether
the allowance of a limited appearance under CPLR 320(c) would
be a sufficient cure for Seider's constitutional infirmities.61 If a
limited appearance were allowed, Seider would become a de facto
judicially created direct action against an insurance company doing
59 The probability that the second forum would have to accord the dis-
claimer full faith and credit is small, but possible nonetheless. For a full
discussion of all the possibilities, see Siegel, Simpson Upholds Seider-
Problems for Both Sides, 159 N.Y.LJ. 1, 4 (Jan. 24, 1963).
60 For a full discussion of the statute of limitations problem see Siegel,
Simpson Upholds Seider-Problems for Both Sides, 159 N.Y.L.J. 1, 4 (Jan.
25, 1968). The suggestion is also made that failure to examine the statute
of limitations problem, given the present state of the law, may even con-
stitute malpractice.
48 Podolsky v. DeVinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 498 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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business in New York. But, the form of the action would be little
changed from what it now is. The defendant would still be more
than a "straw-man," his position in a true legislatively created
direct action. It is thus submitted that even if a limited appear-
ance were allowed, Seider would still not be immune from consti-
tutional and practical difficulties. First, the plaintiff in Podolsky
offered to stipulate that in no event would judgment be taken in
excess of the policy limits if the defendant-insured consented to an
appearance. The effect of the stipulation would have been to allow
the defendant an ad hoc limited appearance. Judge Croake never-
theless indicated dissatisfaction with the fairness of this alternative.
"The fact that a particular stipulation may make it more attractive
for the defendants to appear in this action is no guarantee that
they will do so. Besides the potential liability, the defendants
might not prefer to appear for any number of reasons, e.g., belief
that their interest will be better protected in the New Jersey
courts." 2 While a stipulation is easily distinguished from a
legislated limited appearance, the two reasons offered by Judge
Croake may be applied with equal ease when discussing a limited
appearance. Second, and more important, even if a limited ap-
pearance were allowed, could not other arguments be made against
the constitutionality of the attachment that would still be neces-
sary? Would the attachment be any the less a revision of the
insurer's obligations? Would the "debt" attached be any the less
contingent under CPLR 5201? Would the fiction of a New York
"situs" be any the less egregious? Would Harris v. Balk, which
would still be easily distinguishable, suddenly become applicable?
A second possible alternative implementation of the Seider
purpose would be through a legislatively created direct action
statute. At the outset it should be noted that such a statute would
apparently contravene the public policy of a state, such as New
York, where the mere mention of insurance coverage constitutes
reversible error if irrelevant to the case.6 3 But, perhaps this policy
is changing. At the very least, good arguments may be advanced
against it. It is unrealistic to assume that the typical jury is
unaware that ultimate recovery will be had against an insurance
carrier in an automobile case. 64 Most juries are comprised of
automobile drivers aware of compulsory insurance laws. Indeed,
62 Id. at 500.
63 See, e.g., Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479, 490, 95 N.E. 10,
14-15 (1911); Tacktill v. Eastern Capitol Line, Inc., 260 App. Div. 58,
61, 21 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (lst Dep't 1940). However, disclosure of insurance
coverage to the jury is allowed when such evidence is relevant. Leotta v.
Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 171 N.E.2d 454, 209 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1960),
modified, 9 N.Y.2d 686, 173 N.E.2d 241, 212 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1961).
See Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 1949 Iirs. L.J. 411,
416; Note, The Liability Insurer as the Real Party in Interest, 41 MilN.
L. REv. 784, 790 (1957).
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in Oltarsh the Court took judicial notice of the fact that whenever
insurance coverage is involved most jurors are not ignorant of that
fact.65  Furthermore, the fact of insurance coverage is frequently
revealed as probative evidence on a collateral issue.6 6  Moreover,
it might even be argued that secreting the fact of insurance cover-
age has an adverse effect on the insurer, i.e., it is not able to
instruct the jury that imposing an undue burden on the insurer
through a high verdict will have adverse social and economic
ramificationsY.6
But, apart from the social policy questions of implementing a
direct action statute is the question of whether it would be appli-
cable in a Seider situation. In the few states that have direct
action statutes, the Seider result is unattainable. Louisiana allows
a direct action against all liability insurers only if the accident
occurs in Louisiana.s Wisconsin's statute is similar, but limited
to motor vehicle policies. 69  Rhode Island allows a direct action
on locally written insurance policies.7 0  If New York were to have
a broad direct action statute, the question would become: Does
New York have sufficient contacts and interests to enact and apply
a direct action law in a Seider situation ?7" The only relevant con-
65 15 N.Y.2d 111, 118, 204 N.E.2d 622, 626, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577, 583 (1965).
66See Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-
Law Problems, 74 HARV. L. Rav. 357, 358 (1960).
67 Id. at 359-60.
68 LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (Supp. 1967). See generally Comment,
The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 22 LA. L. REv. 243 (1961). Perhaps
the most liberal interpretation of the statute occurred in Pugh v. Okla-
homa Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. La. 1958) where
jurisdiction was exercised over a nonresident insurer who was not au-
thorized to do business in Louisiana; the only contact that the insurer had
with Louisiana was that it insured a driver who had an accident in
Louisiana. Cf. Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 957 (1962); Honeycutt v. Indiana Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co., 130
So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
69WsS. STAT. ANN. §§204.30(4), 260.11(1) (Supp. 1967). See Koss v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 341 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1965).
70R.I. GEN. LAws. ANN. § 27-7-2 (1956). Other states have more limited
direct action statutes. Arkansas permits direct suit against the insurers of
entities otherwise immune from tort liability. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3240
(Supp. 1966). Judicially created direct actions exist in some states as
adjuncts to their compulsory insurance statutes. See Jones v. Thunderbird
Trans. Co., 178 F. Supp. 9 (D. Kan. 1959); James v. Young, 77 N.D.
451, 43 N.W.2d 692 (1950); Enders v. Longmire, 179 Okla. 633, 67 P.2d
12 (1937). A complete discussion is contained in Note, Direct-Action
Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems, supra note 64.
-'See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 317, 234 N.E.2d 669, 676,
287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 644 (1967) (dissenting opinion). For the conflict of law
problem see Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational md Conflict-
of-Law Problems, supra note 66 at 387-92. For a discussion of New
York's changing concept of conflicts problems see Note, Conflict of Laws
in Tort Actions-The Development of Babcock v. Jackson, 42 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rv. 80 (1967).
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tacts would be an injured resident plaintiff, and the insurer's
presence in New York. That these contacts are insufficient seems
to have been answered by Oltarsh, where Puerto Rican law was
applied because Puerto Rico was the forum with the most relevant
contacts. The conclusion to be drawn is apparently that even a
direct action statute is not the answer for a Seider plaintiff.7 2
Beyond the Seider Problem
There is no attempt made in Podolsky to characterize CPLR
320(c) as unconstitutional in all cases. Judge Croake was par-
ticularly careful to emphasize that it was the character of the res
involved-a contingency-which ultimately rendered the application
of the rule unconstitutional. However, a question is raised con-
cerning the constitutionality of other applications of 320(c) as well
as possible amendment to allow a limited appearance.
The question of whether a defendant in a quasi in rem pro-
ceeding should be allowed a limited appearance to contest the
merits of a claim without submitting to personal jurisdiction is
appropriate for extended debate. Early state and federal cases
accepted the view that the defendant should be afforded the right
of a limited appearance whereas recent cases have turned the tide
in the opposite direction.7
3
Perhaps the strongest arguments against a limited appearance
rule are that it violates principles of res judicata and that it is
logically unsound. Thus, if a limited appearance is allowed in a
quasi in rem proceeding, and the res is insufficient to satisfy the
claim, the plaintiff, who is not barred by the in rem action, must
relitigate the identical issues against the defendant where personal
72 Perhaps a more meaningful solution is to allow an action by the in-
jured plaintiff against his own insurance company. Keeton & O'Connell,
Basic Protection Plan for Traffic Accident Losses, 43 No=a DAmE LAW.
184 (1967).
73 See Developments in the La--State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 909, 953 (1960). Cases that would allow a limited appearance
include: McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877, 881-82
(4th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v.
Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 F. 214, 218-19 (6th Cir. 1922); Miller
Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286, 291-92 (1953), rev. on
other grounds, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224
Mass. 14, ......... 112 N.E. 500, 502 (1916).
Cases opposed to a limited appearance include: United States v.
Balanovski, 236 F.2d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968
(1957); Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765, 769-70 (D. Neb. 1953);
Campbell v. Murdock, 90 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Sands v. Lef-
court Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1955); State
ex. rel. Methodist Old People's Home v. Crawford, 159 Ore. 377, 80
P.2d 873 (1938).
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jurisdiction is obtainable.74  It is also arguable that a limited
appearance is logically unsound because litigation on the merits
assumes the adjudication of personal rights and liabilities and these
should not be subject to varying decision by different courts.7 5
Another argument, admittedly weak, is that a defendant who does
not exercise his option to default, but appears to contest the plain-
tiff, manifests an ability and willingness to litigate in the forum and
should therefore be liable for the whole claim.76
An equally impressive array of arguments is available for
allowing a limited appearance. In all fairness, why should a de-
fendant be forced to choose between losing his property by default
or incurring, in a possibly unfamiliar and inconvenient forum, a
judgment which may far exceed its value, simply because he has
property in the state? Furthermore, if jurisdiction is originally
based on control over property, why should the jurisdiction be
transformed into in personam simply because the defendant ap-
pears ? 7  Moreover, is not the defendant being forced, in contra-
vention of due process, to either waive his immunity from personal
jurisdiction in a state devoid of substantial contact or alternatively
be deprived of his property? 78
The major difficulty with 320(c) is that by framing the issue
in terms of quasi in rem jurisdiction it obscures the type of
analysis necessary to a solution of modern jurisdictional problems.70
74See Developments in the Law--Res Tirdicata, 65 HARv. L. Rsv.
818, 834 (1952). "[A] valid quasi-in-rem judgment . . . is not con-
clusive without jurisdiction over the defendant, as to the personal cause of
action." But see Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Dredging Co.,
189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939). (In a previous action between the parties
in Louisiana, the Louisiana court held that appearance of the Mississippi
defendant in a quasi in rein proceeding did not warrant a personal judg-
ment. Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Co., 179 La. 317, 154 So.
10 (1934). In the Mississippi action for the deficiency, the court held that
the defendant had already had its day in court on the defense asserted in
the previous action).
75 Developments in the Law--State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rsv.
909, 953 (1960).
76 rd.
77 Id. at 954.
78 Id. See generally, Graziano & Frumer, Jurisdictional Dilemma of the
Non-resident Defendant in New York-A Proposed Solution, 19 FORDHAM
L. REv. 125 (1950).
78 "It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions between in rem
and in personain, high time now in a mobile society where property in-
creasingly becomes intangible and the fictional res becomes stronger and
stronger. Insofar as courts remain given to asking 'Res, res-who's got
the res?,' they cripple their evaluation of the real factors that should
determine jurisdiction. They cannot evaluate the real factors squarely until
they give up the ghost of the res." Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Neces-
saryr, 37 TExAs L. REv. 657, 663 (1959).
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Two hypotheticals, will illustrate. X, a resident of California, is
involved in an automobile accident in Illinois with Y, a New York
resident. X's insurer does not do business in New York, and X
has no property in or contacts with New York except that X is owed
a debt by an interstate corporation that does business in New
York. Y commences an action against X quasi in rem. The
amount attached, although a substantial sum, amounts to only 15%
of the total amount claimed. Should a limited appearance be
allowed ?8o
X, a resident of New Jersey, is involved in an automobile
accident in Pennsylvania with Y, a New York resident. X has
no contacts with New York except that he owns a substantial
amount of income-producing real property in the state. Y attaches
X's property. Should a limited appearance be allowed?
Rule 320(c) answers both of the above in the negative. The
philosophy is that a limited appearance is wasteful and that the
attachment will act as a convenient wedge to force the defendant to
defend here personally. The difficulty arises in the failure to dis-
tinguish one type of property from another, and the failure to
continue analysis of the problem once the answer to the question
-where is the situs?-is reached. Such important jurisdictional
considerations as the law to be applied, convenience of the parties,
and the defendant's voluntary contacts with the forum are ignored.
What is the cure? Should a limited appearance be allowed in
all cases? It is submitted that the answer to the latter question
is clearly no. A limited appearance would only serve to perpetuate
the conceptualism of distinguishing quasi in rem and personal
jurisdiction. Does this mean that the defendant in the first hypo-
thetical should be forced to choose between abandoning his prop-
erty or defending in New York? The answer is again no. The
real problem in both hypotheticals is whether jurisdiction should
be asserted at all. And it is submitted that the problem could best
be answered by a statutory forum non conveniens supplement to the
so Hopefully, the hypothetical illustrates the mischief of uncontrolled use
of quasi in rem jurisdiction today. The doctrine was once very useful as
a supplement to personal jurisdiction when the only basis for its exercise
was physical power over the defendant. Quasi in rem jurisdiction then
acted to discourage the absconding defendant from leaving the forum.
But, today, the tables have turned; the plaintiff now has "long-arm"
statutes at his disposal for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. And quasi
in rem jurisdiction is likely to be exercised in situations in which, "the
defendant ought not to be asked to defend in the forum chosen by the
plaintiff." Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction,
76 HARv. L. REv. 303, 306 (1962).
The doctrine evolved at a time when intangible obligations were not
recognized and real property was at the center of society. The modern cor-
poration doing business in several states was not contemplated. The growth
of the corporation which allows the intangible to have a situs at many
different locations causes the defendant his principal problem.
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CPLR.8 1 The statute would change the present New York judi-
cially created forum non conveniens rules requiring a court to
accept jurisdiction of an action if the plaintiff or defendant is a
resident . 2  A statutory forum non conveniens supplement would
allow the court to weigh all the factors involved. If it were fair
to exercise jurisdiction considering the forum non conveniens fac-
tors, it would be exercised and use could be made of 320(c) to
acquire full personal jurisdiction. If it were considered unfair to
exercise jurisdiction, it would be declined. The question of a
limited as opposed to a full appearance would not be reached.
81 See, e.g., UNIFORM INTERSTATE: & INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE Acr
§ 1.05. "When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the
action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just."
The provision is drawn from Wis. STAT. ANN. §262.19 (Supp. 1967),
which mandates that the movant stipulate consent to suit in the preferred
forum and waive any statute of limitation defenses. Among the relevant
factors are amenability to personal jurisdiction elsewhere, the relative
convenience of parties and witnesses, pertinent conflict of law rules and
any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection of a
convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.
There is evidence that Illinois, one of the pioneers of long-arm juris-
diction, may now be reassessing its position on forami non conveniens. See
Comment, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Illinois, 1964 U. ILL.
L.F. 646.
In the federal courts, forum non conveniens considerations are embodied
in the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964). For a general
discussion, see Note, The Problems Regarding The Federal Transfer Statute
-Much Ado About Nothing, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 93 (1967).
82 Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152,
161, 139 N.E. 223, 226 (1923) (if the plaintiff is a resident the court may
not apply the doctrine) ; De La Bouillerie v. DeVienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 62,
89 N.E.2d 15 (1949) (if the plaintiff or the defendant is a resident, the court
may not apply the doctrine). These restrictions tend to make wooden what
is supposed to be a discretionary doctrine. At one time, the doctrine was
applied in New York in spite of the fact that one of the parties was a
resident. See Annot., 32 A.L.R. 1, 26-27 (1924). Although the doctrine
has b;en applied sparingly in in rem cases, Central Pub. Co. v. Whitman,
283 App. Div. 492, 128 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1st Dep't 1954), the fact that the
defendant has property within the state should not, of itself, be controlling.
Historically, the plea of formn non conveniens has been sustained in spite
of this fact. La Soci6t6 du Gaz de Paris v. La Socit6 Anonyme de
Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais", [1926] Sess. Cas. 13 (Scot.); Wil-
liamson v. Northeastern Ry., [1884] 11 Rettie (Sess. Cas., 4th Ser.) 596
(a resident of the forum sued the defendant for negligence causing the
death of her husband. Jurisdiction was based on an attachment. The plea
of forum non conveniens was nevertheless sustained). See Blair, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo American Law, 29 CoLum.
L. REv. 1, 19 n.89 (1929). A discussion of the use of the federal transfer
statute to alleviate the potential hardship that quasi in rem jurisdiction
may pose for a defendant is contained in Carrington, The Modern Utility
of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HAzy. L. Rsv. 303, 311-12 (1962).
NOTES
Conclusion
The Seider doctrine was born in haste, as is evidenced by its
many deleterious side effects, and its saving grace is that it vividly
emphasizes the need for a redefinition of the modern role of garnish-
ment of intangibles and, indeed, the whole doctrine of quasi in
rem jurisdiction.
International Shwe redefined personal jurisdiction in terms of
minimum contacts, fair play and substantial justice. But no
Supreme Court case has effected a similar overhaul in the concept
of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The result is an exercise of juris-
diction on two jurisprudentially different planes, a mixture of
water and oil. In contrast to the modern test for in personam
jurisdiction, the conceptualism of Pennoyer and Harris is retained
in the quasi in rem situation.
Substantial progress has been made toward an integrated juris-
dictional test in the area of trust litigation. Mr. Justice Jackson
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.83 remarked:
Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam are ancient
and originally expressed in procedural terms what seems really to
have been a distinction in the substantive law of property under a
system quite unlike our own. . . . The legal recognition and rise
in economic importance of incorporeal or intangible forms of property
have upset the ancient simplicity of property law and the clarity of
its distinctions, while new forms of proceedings have confused the
old procedural classification.
But, Hanson v. Denwka,84 through its analysis of trust litigation
in terms of in rem jurisdiction, has served to perpetuate the dis-
tinction between actions quasi in rem and in personam.s5  The
most significant state court decision that rejects the concept of situs
is Atkinson v. Superior Court,.8 where the problem of jurisdiction
over an intangible was analyzed in terms of interests and contacts.
There has been no similar re-examination of the bases and effect
of quasi in rem jurisdiction in New York. In his opinion in
Simpson, Chief judge Fuld calls for just such a re-examination8s
From his explicit reference to the convenience of the parties per-
haps a statutory form of forum non conveniens will be adopted.
83339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
84357 U.S. 235 (1958).
s See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the li
Personamn Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 617 (1958).
8-349 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied sub norn., Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357
U.S. 569 (1958).87 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 312, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287
N.Y.S.2d 633, 638 (1967).
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